Parliamentarism, like an unburied ghost, cyclically returns to Brazilian public debate, presenting itself in times of institutional crisis as a magical solution to national political impasses. Such a proposal invariably resurfaces in new garments. Yet, as in the past, it promises stability, rationality, and crisis containment. However, behind this technical and modernizing veneer lies a historical project aimed at draining popular power and neutralizing the only institution with some capacity for direct expression of popular will in Brazil: the Presidency of the Republic.
The recurrence of this theme is not by chance. It expresses, on the one hand, a diffuse dissatisfaction with the instability of national politics, and on the other, a persistent desire among segments of the ruling elites to limit the transformative impulses that, in key moments of Brazilian history, have emerged through presidential leadership. Unlike other parliamentary democracies—where the regime emerged from long processes of institutionalization and balance of powers—parliamentarism in Brazil has always been invoked or instituted in contexts of rupture or obliteration of popular sovereignty.
It is important to recall that Brazil has had two concrete experiences with parliamentarism in its history. The first, during the Second Reign, was profoundly different from the British model. Brazilian “reverse parliamentarism” bore a peculiar trait: the President of the Council of Ministers—equivalent to a Prime Minister—was appointed by the Emperor, not by parliamentary majority. This arrangement defied the basic principle of liberal European parliamentarism, subordinating the legislative to the personal will of the Crown. Rather than a step toward democratic institutionalization, it reinforced the personalism of imperial power and its role as supreme arbiter of political disputes.
The second experiment with parliamentarism, at the beginning of the 1960s, was even more troubling. After President Jânio Quadros resigned on August 25, 1961, Vice President João Goulart was on an official trip to the People’s Republic of China. His imminent succession was opposed by conservative sectors of the Armed Forces and civil groups critical of his political orientation rooted in Vargas-era laborism. Faced with the impasse, parliamentarism was imposed as a compromise—an artificial legal and political maneuver—to prevent Goulart from exercising the full powers of the presidency.
In this case, parliamentarism did not emerge from parliamentary deliberation or popular will, but was the direct result of institutional blackmail, negotiated behind the scenes. Hastily approved in September 1961, the system sought to drastically curtail Goulart’s protagonism, subjecting him to a cabinet of ministers and stripping him of his constitutional prerogatives. Though formally legal, the measure subverted the established constitutional framework—it was, clearly, a violation of the republican structure defined by the 1946 Constitution.
This parliamentary regime did not survive popular pressure. In January 1963, a national plebiscite restored presidentialism with an overwhelming majority. Once reinstated with full constitutional powers, Goulart set out to implement the so-called Basic Reforms: a comprehensive program addressing agrarian reform, education, taxation, banking, university structure, and the political system. The goal was to advance, within legal and parliamentary bounds, toward a more just society, expanding citizenship and confronting Brazil’s deep structural inequalities.
The elite response was swift and decisive. On April 1, 1964, Goulart was deposed, ending the fragile democratic process that had already been shaken by the suicide of Getúlio Vargas. With all its social and class contradictions, Goulart’s attempt to carry out a reformist, national-developmentalist agenda marked the high point of tensions between Executive and Legislative powers. For some, the “lesson” had to be learned—even at the cost of a 21-year authoritarian regime.
In the New Republic, the 1988 Constitution sought to rebuild democratic foundations by preserving the presidentialist system. However, since the 1990s, there has been a growing hypertrophy of the Legislative branch. Beginning with the Fernando Henrique Cardoso administration, a new model of governability emerged—one based on political bargaining with Congress, involving broad budgetary concessions, patronage, and the granting of parliamentary amendments. “Coalition presidentialism”—a term coined by Sérgio Abranches—became the dominant arrangement, though not without its costs: weakened presidential authority, party fragmentation, political clientelism, and the obstruction of public-interest agendas.
Today, the parliamentarist proposal reemerges in new guises: whether through formal constitutional reforms or through the informal strengthening of Congress in budgetary and political matters. The centrality of the presidency—a historical hallmark of Brazil’s political system—has been deliberately undermined. From the 1891 Constitution (our first republican charter) through the 1988 text, Brazil’s institutional architecture consistently assigned the President the dual role of Head of State and Government, concentrating both symbolic and executive functions essential to national cohesion. This was not an accident of history but rather a structural response to Brazil’s vast territory, regional inequalities, and persistent federal tensions.
What we see today is not merely a replay of the long-standing tension between centralism and federalism, but a novel form of Executive emasculation in favor of an opaque, intra-oligarchic legislature.
Another crucial point is the Executive’s unique ability to mobilize society. In Brazilian history, presidents—unlike members of Congress—have been the only actors capable of galvanizing mass support and articulating popular demands. The case of Leonel Brizola, Governor of Rio Grande do Sul during the 1961 Legality Campaign, is illustrative: Brizola successfully resisted the coup attempt to block Goulart’s succession, relying on grassroots support and legalist military sectors.
Parliamentarism, as currently proposed, represents the death of politics as a space for competing national projects—if such still exist. It fosters elite agreements, minimal liberal consensus, and an institutional game closed to popular participation, thus neutralizing any possibility of a project committed to national transformation.
Now more than ever, Brazil needs presidential leadership that rises to meet its historical and social demands. More than a matter of personalism, it is about understanding that only a strong presidency—anchored in popular mobilization—can steer structural reforms and confront the entrenched interests that sustain Brazil’s dependency and underdevelopment.
© The Political Crow 
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